This paper demonstrates that under conditions of imperfect (oligopolistic)
Introduction
The last decade has seen a widespread discussion on the relation between national tax systems and the strategic decisions on the part of multinational enterprises (MNEs) concerning the location of their investment, production and pro…ts. At the heart of the matter is the fear that low-tax countries may attract a disproportionate share of the activities of MNEs at the expense of high-tax countries.
Equally worrisome are the possibilities open for MNEs to shift income from hightax to low-tax jurisdictions. Such income shifting can be undertaken by choosing transfer prices for intra-…rm transactions that would increase costs in high-tax jurisdictions and income in low-tax jurisdictions. At present, the taxation of pro…ts of MNEs is in most countries based on Separate Accounting (SA) principles. Under SA, total income by the MNE is divided among its a¢liates based on each a¢li-ate's accounts and the application of an arm's length pricing standard for intra-…rm transactions. Since the price on such intra-company transactions often is not observable in the market place, national tax authorities rely on several methods to impute the price that would have obtained between independent parties. These methods involve either the use of (a) comparable arm's length prices for similar transactions, (b) estimated costs plus a pro…t margin, (c) the resale price (achieved by subtracting a measure of pro…ts from the sales price), (d) split pro…ts (that is, partitioning of pro…ts between the vendor and the purchaser), or (e) comparable pro…t measures. 1 Not only are these methods imperfect and costly to administrate, but the use of arm's length pricing standards are not coordinated internationally. Hence, there is a potential of con ‡ict between states that happen to use di¤erent standards on the same transaction. 2 Recently policy-makers and economists have pointed out that the problems related to pro…t shifting and Transfer Pricing (TP) under SA warrant a switch to a 1 The US has recently enacted laws that allow the use of quite di¤erent schemes to curb transfer pricing such as the Comparable Pro…ts method (see Schjelderup and Weichenrieder (1999) , for an analysis) and the Advanced Pricing scheme. 2 See Raimondos-Møller and Scharf (1998) for an analysis of this issue.
2 system more similar to that practiced by the US on domestic …rms. 3 When taxing domestic …rms located in di¤erent states, the US does not rely on SA but instead on formulas to calculate the tax base applicable in individual states. These formulas in e¤ect apportion US assets, sales, and/or payroll to any individual state in which the …rms operate and then use these shares to compute the base applicable for taxation in that state. 4 This system, called Formula Apportionment (FA), is by many seen as a superior method of taxing multinationals, since it ensures that MNEs cannot evade taxation in any single state as long as it has some activity going on in that state. FA, therefore, is perceived to curtail or even eliminate the incentives for using TP to shift pro…ts into low-tax countries. Although there are some disadvantages related to the use of FA, for example, that it may under certain circumstances create price distortions, the overriding argument in favor of FA seems to be its favorable impact over SA with respect to curbing transfer pricing. 5 Most of the literature on pro…t shifting and transfer pricing pay little attention to the nature of competition in …nal markets and assume that subsidiaries of multinationals are monopolists in their local markets. The focal point in these papers is how di¤erences in national tax systems as well as tari¤s a¤ect the incentives to engage in transfer pricing. 6 However, the nature of competition in local markets are more often than not oligopolistic (e.g. the car industry or the oil industry).
Under oligopoly, it has been shown by Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997) that transfer prices trade-o¤ tax incentives against strategic incentives.
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The strategic role of the transfer price occurs because the multinational can use transfer pricing as an instrument to capture markets shares in local markets and thereby increase its pro…ts.
For example, if a¢liates of a multinational …rm face oligopolistic competition, the multinational can gain by setting the transfer price at a central level and delegate 3 See e.g. Musgrave (1973) , Bird and Brean (1986) , McLure (1989) , Bucks and Mazerov (1993) , and Shackelford and Slemrod (1998). Canada practices a system similar to the US and with greater emphasis on harmonization of tax bases. Mintz (2000) provides a survey of the US and Canadian tax rules under FA. 4 See Weiner (1996) for a survey of these rules. 5 See Gordon and Wilson (1986) , for an analysis of factor price distortions under FA. 6 See e.g. Kant (1990) , and more recently Schjelderup and Weichenrieder (1999 8 To see why, suppose the MNE sets the transfer price at a central level, but allows its subsidiaries to set quantities in local markets (Cournot competition). If the central level sets the transfer price low, an importing a¢liate becomes a low cost …rm that behaves aggressively by selling a large quantity. Such aggressive behavior under Cournot competition induces its local rival to behave softly by setting a low quantity. The soft response from the rival is bene…cial to the multinational …rm as a whole. Hence, delegation can achieve higher pro…ts than would arise if all decisions were undertaken centrally. The implication is that the transfer price has a strategic value in addition to being an instrument for pro…t shifting.
This paper undertakes a reexamination of the implications of Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment for transfer pricing activities of MNEs. The emphasis is on whether FA may be preferable to SA in a setting where the MNE has leverage to engage in pro…t shifting via TP. We show that if competition occurs under oligopoly and decision-making in multinationals are decentralized, a switch from SA to FA will not eliminate transfer pricing. Such a reform may actually intensify the pro…t shifting activities of MNEs via transfer pricing. This result is valid under even the most favorable assumptions for FA involving international agreement over both the appropriate tax base to be used for allocating income and the formula apportionment weights. Such agreement is normally claimed to eliminate any incentive to engage in TP (see Gordon and Wilson, (1986) ). Under oligopoly, however, even agreement over these crucial issues will not prevent MNEs from shifting pro…ts between countries, as we demonstrate below.
In the next sections we proceed as follows. In section 2 we set up a standard model of a horizontally integrated MNE that undertakes intra-…rm trade in …nal 8 It is well known in the Industrial Organization (IO) literature that a principal may gain extra bene…t by hiring an agent and giving him/her the incentive to maximize something other than the welfare of the principal. See e.g. Vickers (1985) , Sklivas (1987) , and Fershtmann and Judd (1987), Katz (1991) , and Basu (1993) . These precommitment gains have been shown to exist even if one allows for renegotiation of the contract between the principal and the agent (Caillaud et.al. (1995) 
Transfer pricing incentives under monopoly
The model used is one of horizontally integrated trade in a secondary processed good.
The MNE has two a¢liates, each in one of the two countries to be called country 
0:
It is assumed that the MNE is able to practice price discrimination between the two markets. 9 The pro…ts of the a¢liates are de…ned as
(1)
and the global before tax pro…t as
Equation (3) completes the set up of the model. In the two next subsections we investigate the transfer pricing incentives by MNEs under SA and FA. 9 Price discrimination is assumed to exist due to market segmentation.
Formula Apportionment (FA)
Under the FA scheme, global pro…ts are apportioned to each country based on the activities of the MNE in each country in proportion to the MNE's world-wide activities. 10 Under a general formula apportionment system, the tax liability to the government in country i would be equal to
where t i = is country i's tax rate ® i = weight given to factor j in the apportionment formula ( P ® j = 1)
= taxable global pro…ts as de…ned by country i's tax law In the above formula the part of the multinational's global pro…ts which is allocated to country i is found by weighting the relative capital stock, relative sales, and relative payroll of that country. To simplify, but without loss of generality, we assume in our analysis that ® K = ® P = 0, so that only sales enter the formula.
In addition, we assume that taxable pro…ts do not di¤er from true pro…ts in each country so that
By doing so we eliminate the most common distortions that create incentives for TP. Given these simplifying assumptions, the multinational's tax liability to the government in country i is equal to
Consequently, global after tax pro…ts under FA are
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The FA system is currently used in the U.S., Canada, and Switzerland to tax national …rms, which operate in multiple states/cantons.
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where µ = S A (1¡t a )+S B (1¡t B ) S = 1 ¡ t is equal to one minus the average after tax rate (denoted by t) on global pro…ts.
It is evident from (5) that even if the MNE can manipulate the transfer price (q) within some limits, the transfer price does not have a meaningful role as a pro…t shifting device. To see this notice from (5) that,
so that when the a¢liates are monopolists in their local markets, the transfer price does not a¤ect global after-tax pro…ts. The reason is that the transfer price cannot interfere with sales decisions for the two markets.
11 Equation (6), then, essentially con…rms conventional beliefs that imposing the FA scheme on multinationals will eliminate incentives for pro…t shifting.
Separate Accounting (SA)
Under the Separate Accounting method of taxation each country imposes a tax on the pro…ts generated within its country borders, i.e. pro…ts are taxed in the country of source. Although repatriated pro…ts are taxed in the country of residence, there is general agreement that due to deferral possibilities and limited tax credit rules, the source principle of taxation is e¤ectively in operation (see Keen (1993) and Tanzi and Bovenberg (1990) ). Taking this into account, global after tax pro…ts are given by
If the multinational practices transfer pricing, then over-and underinvoicing will occur in order to minimize tax payments. In particular, the MNE will set its transfer price according to the sign of
Equation (7) makes it clear that if t B > t A ; and if the MNE is not bound by transfer pricing regulation, its optimal high transfer price is the price that makes pro…ts in 11 Taxation under FA will in general in ‡uence the MNE's sales in the two markets, but the e¤ects on sales run via the formula for calculating the average tax rate, not via the transfer price.
7 country B zero. 12 Such a price will shift all pro…ts to the low tax country thereby minimizing global tax payments of the MNE. If t B < t A ; it would be desirable with a low transfer that shifts all pro…ts to the a¢liate in B.
In general MNEs are not at liberty to choose transfer prices freely, but must adhere to arm's length prices. Although these prices may not be accurate in the sense that they eliminate the pro…t shifting activities of MNEs, they most often prevent the extreme cases we have outlined above. We emphasize, however, that equation (7) shows that under SA, the MNE has incentives to either under-or overinvoice the price on intra-…rm sales. Thus, only in so far as tax authorities are successful in imposing 'true' arm's length prices can pro…t shifting be completely prevented. Evidence suggest that this is indeed very di¢cult.
To summarize our discussion of the FA and SA schemes so far, we may state:
Proposition 1 Under monopoly and international harmonization of national tax bases, a switch from SA to FA eliminates the transfer pricing incentives of the multinational …rm.
Notice that the success of the FA scheme relies on some quite strong assumptions.
In itself, the harmonization of national tax bases is a formidable task. Furthermore, the assumption that a¢liates hold monopoly positions in national markets is not only strong, but also clearly at odds with empirical observations. In the next section we will show that introducing oligopolistic competition in at least one market will cause incentives for TP to reappear under FA.
Transfer pricing under oligopolistic competition
We introduce oligopolistic competition into the present set up by assuming that the a¢liate in country B faces a local rival. We take quantity to be the strategic variable in market B, but our qualitative results do not depend on this, as we shall 12 A subsidiary, which is incorporated in a foreign country cannot gain any tax advantage by showing losses in the foreign country since such losses in most countries cannot be deducted against home pro…ts. We assume for simplicity the absence of any carry-forward or carry-backward provisions (i.e., the period considered may be perceived as long enough for such strategies to be exhausted). 
where pro…ts by the a¢liate in country B now are
As before, ¼ A are pro…ts in country A: Before we examine how transfer prices are set under FA and SA, we examine how the multinational …rm will set the transfer price in the absence of taxation.
When the multinational …rm delegates decisions about quantities to its a¢liates in national markets, the central authority of the MNE must take into account that the transfer price will have an impact on the outcome of competition in market B. A high transfer price, for example, will make the a¢liate in B into a highcost …rm, while a low transfer price will have the opposite e¤ect. To …nd the optimal transfer price that triggers the most favorable response from the competitor, therefore, the central authority within the MNE must make sure that the pricing strategy maximizes global after tax pro…ts. 
13
Notice that the assumption that there is monopoly in country A does not a¤ect any of our results in a qualitative way. Introducing duopoly in country A would, however, dampen the incentive to increase sales in B because of the cost linkage to the duopoly in country A.
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The central authority within the MNE maximizes global pro…ts with respect to q; and the …rst order condition is:
where we have used the fact that @S
14 The central authority takes into account the response by its a¢liates when it sets q: Hence, using (8) in (9), and solving for (q ¡ C 0 ) we obtain
where
Equation (10) shows that in the absence of taxes, the transfer price will di¤er from marginal cost under oligopolistic competition. 16 The strategic e¤ect indicates that it is pro…table to set the transfer price below marginal cost in order to render the …rm in country B into a low-cost …rm that behaves aggressively by increasing its quantity: 17 This is bene…cial for the MNE since the local competitor's best response to such behavior is to reduce its sales, thereby allowing the a¢liate (and thus the MNE as a whole) to earn higher pro…ts. We can therefore conclude that under oligopolistic competition the transfer price in the absence of taxation is a strategic device, which can be used by multinationals to win market shares. The competitor's response hinges on the observability of the transfer price. The multinational …rm has a strong incentive to reveal the transfer price to its competitior. In many cases the transfer price is observable since custom lists over imports and their prices are public information. See Katz (1991) for a discussion on the issue of observability in general.
In the two next sections we examine how transfer pricing incentives are a¤ected by taxation when FA and SA applies. We then compare how the transfer price is set under the two tax schemes.
Formula Apportionment (FA)
Under FA, global pro…ts after tax are (as before) given by
The …rst order condition with respect to q is:
Using (8) in (11) and rearranging we have that
where q F A is the transfer price under FA. Equation (12) shows that there are two e¤ects present. The …rst e¤ect, the strategic e¤ect (¾) ; is the same as before and indicates, ceteris paribus, that the transfer price should be set below marginal cost. The second term (i.e., the squared bracket) is the pro…t shifting incentive or tax manipulation e¤ect. Since the transfer price will in ‡uence the quantities sold by the MNE at home and abroad, varying it will a¤ect the average tax rate facing the MNE. If for instance t A < t B , then raising q F A will induce a decline in S B and an increase in S A : The weight attached to t B in the formula for the average tax rate is consequently reduced, and this lowers the average tax rate to the bene…t of the MNE. We conclude that under FA, the MNE has an additional incentive to distort the transfer price so as to shift pro…ts to minimize its tax payments.
Closer inspection of the tax manipulation e¤ect reveals that its sign depends on sign (t B ¡ t A ) : If t A < t B ; the tax e¤ect is positive, indicating a transfer price above marginal costs. 18 With country B a high tax country relative to country A, the MNE would like to reduce sales in B by increasing the transfer price so as to bring down the average tax rate. In optimum, the …rm balances the bene…ts of increasing its market share in B by setting a low transfer price (the strategic e¤ect) against the gains from lowering the e¤ective rate of tax (the tax manipulation e¤ect). Since the tax manipulation e¤ect counteracts the strategic e¤ect when t A < t B ; the outcome is ambiguous (i.e., q F A R C 0 ) and will depend on the properties of demand and cost functions as well as tax rates.
If t A > t B ; the MNE would like for tax saving reasons to increase sales in country B (and reduce its sales in A) to reduce the burden of the high level of taxation in country A. The incentive to save tax in this case reinforces the strategic e¤ect leading to an even lower transfer price (q F A < C 0 ).
It is now straightforward to show that if price in country B were the strategic variable between the local competitor and the a¢liate of the MNE, a formula similar in structure to that given in (12) would appear. In such a setting the strategic incentive taken alone would dictate a transfer price above marginal costs. The intuition is that a high transfer price will force the a¢liate in B to set a high price on its …nal sales. The local rival's best response to such a policy is to set a high price as well. Such non-aggressive behavior by the local competitor is bene…cial to the a¢liate of the MNE (and the MNE as a whole). The tax incentives will in this framework be in the same direction as before. For the case of t A < t B the tax saving incentive works in same direction as the strategic e¤ect, leading to a transfer price above marginal costs (q F A > C 0 ). If on the other hand t A > t B ; the tax e¤ect warrants a low transfer price. In this case the total e¤ect is ambiguous, and the transfer price may be above or below marginal costs.
Summing up, this section has demonstrated that FA will not eliminate transfer pricing, if there is oligopolistic competition in markets. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a transition to FA leads to more transfer pricing than does
SA. In what follows we examine transfer pricing under SA, and then compare the 18 Notice that ³ @SA @SB S B ¡ S A´< 0, since from comparative statics it is easily seen that @SA @SB
0;
assuming that the …rm is facing either constant or increasing marginal costs.
two principles of taxation to see if one involves more transfer pricing than the other.
Separate Accounting (SA)
The maximization procedure under SA is the same as that under FA. Notice that since the MNE delegates decision-making about quantities to its a¢liates, the second step of the maximization procedure is identical under the two tax schemes.
Hence, the …rst order conditions given by equation (8) are valid also under SA 19 .
In the …rst stage of the maximization procedure, the central layer of the MNE,
with respect to q. A marginal change in q has the following e¤ect on global after tax pro…ts,
Rearranging (13), using (8), we obtain the optimal transfer price, q = q SA ; as
As under FA (cf. equation (12)), the …rst term in (14) represents the strategic e¤ect, while the last term stands for the tax manipulation e¤ect. In the case of zero or identical tax rates, the pricing rule becomes identical to that obtained under FA, that is, q ¡ C 0 = ¾ < 0; as the strategic e¤ects are the same, and tax manipulation e¤ects are absent.
If t B > t A ; it is pro…table for tax saving purposes to charge a transfer price above marginal costs thereby shifting pro…ts to the a¢liate in the low tax country
The tax motive in this case acts against the strategic e¤ect, and the total outcome depends on the relative magnitude of the two e¤ects. If t B < t A , the MNE for tax 19 For a full formalization of the delegation approach under SA see Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997) .
13 reasons wishes to set q SA < C 0 , and this is in accordance with the strategic e¤ect.
The outcome is therefore a transfer price below marginal cost.
If price was the strategic variable between the local competitor and the a¢liate, it can be shown (see Schjelderup and Sørgard, 1997 ) that the strategic incentive alone would dictate a high transfer price. The intuition is the same as that given under FA.
We can summarize our …ndings in this section by the following statement, Proposition 2 Under oligopolistic competition, both the FA and the SA schemes provide incentives for transfer pricing.
Whether one scheme induces more transfer pricing than the other is the topic of the next section.
Comparisons of Results
The purpose of this section is to compare how MNEs set the transfer price under FA and SA. We collect our results from the previous section in the table below (referring to (12) and (14)): (14) from (12) . It is then the case that q F A ¡ q SA < 0 if and only if
The …rst term in (15) is the di¤erence between the strategic e¤ect under FA and
. From our previous discussion it follows that the strategic e¤ects dictate a low transfer price. We may thus state:
Proposition 3 The MNE will have stronger incentives for strategic reasons alone to underinvoice under SA than FA if t A > t B (and vice versa for t A < t B ):
The reason is that under SA, pro…ts in each country are subject to the national tax rate. The impact of the transfer price as a strategic weapon under SA therefore depends on the relative tax rates as expressed by the ratio We set t A = 0:3 and let t B vary between zero and unity. Figure   1 shows the results of the numerical simulations. The two transfer pricing formulas 20 This assumption weakens the tax e¤ect under FA since the term (@S A =@S B ) S B is eliminated from the optimal pricing formula in (12) . However, numerical simulations -using quadratic cost 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the incentives on the part of multinationals to engage in transfer pricing under formula apportionment and separate accounting. A widely held belief among both policymakers and economists is that a transition to a system of formula apportionment will eliminate the pro…t shifting incentives of multinationals. Our analysis does not support this belief. In particular, we …nd that in markets involving multinationals, pro…t shifting incentives are not eliminated under formula apportionment. The reason is that under oligopolistic competition the transfer price takes on a dual role as both a strategic and a tax saving device. The strategic effect arises since the MNEs can bene…t from setting the transfer price at a central level, but delegate decision-making about quantities (or prices) in local markets to its a¢liates in these markets. Since a¢liates then take the transfer price as given, the central layer of the MNE can use the transfer price as a strategic device to win markets shares in local markets under oligopoly. In particular, if quantity is the strategic variable, the strategic e¤ect dictates a subsidy to a¢liates in the sense that the transfer price should be set below marginal costs of exporting. The tax saving role of the transfer price under formula apportionment arises, since an increase in local sales changes the tax liabilities of the MNE via a change in its average e¤ective tax rate. The strategic bene…ts may therefore be counteracted or enhanced by the incentive to reduce tax payments, depending on the relation between tax rates in countries in which the MNE operates.
Our second policy question concerned a comparison of the pro…t shifting incentives under formula apportionment to that under separate accounting. If tax rates are not harmonized, the analysis …nds that the strategic and tax-saving incen-tives to exploit transfer pricing may well be stronger under formula apportionment than under separate accounting. Whereas the analytical comparisons between the two schemes do not yield conclusive insights, a simple numerical example demonstrates that the incentive to set a low transfer price can be more pronounced under formula apportionment, when the subsidiary of the MNE exposed to oligopolistic competition is located in the high tax country. A general lesson that emerges from the analysis, con…rming the …ndings of Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997) , is that the strategic incentives for transfer pricing can be quite strong.
The analysis in this paper has assumed given tax rates. However, besides affecting transfer pricing on the part of MNEs, a move from separate accounting to formula apportionment may also a¤ect the general level of corporate income taxes.
In a companion paper we examine whether the introduction of formula apportionment is likely to raise or lower taxes (cfr. Nielsen et. al. (1999) ).
